Introduction
The study of the International Law Commission (ILC) on Identification of Customary International Law has sparked a renewed interest in an old academic debate: how is it possible to establish the existence of a customary rule? Aimed at providing a set of guidelines for practitioners, 1 the Draft Conclusions contain one of the boldest statements ever made about the process of formation of customary rules: the practice of international organizations (IOs) as
Part Five provides a non-exhaustive list of materials which may have evidentiary value for the purposes of identification of customary rules. They include treaties, 18 resolutions of IOs and intergovernmental conferences, 19 decisions of courts and tribunals, 20 and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. 21 There is no reference to the work of the ILC itself. Part Six deals with the persistent objector rule 22 while Part Seven provides some general criteria on how to identify a rule of special custom. 
The concept of customary international law endorsed by the ILC
The study of the ILC is not explicitly based on any specific theory of CIL. However, any statement made in the Draft Conclusions in relation to the formation and identification of CIL can be related to a defined theoretical stance about the nature of law in general and international law in particular. It is in this light that the originality of the text of the Draft Conclusions may be contested and the relevance of the statement on the contribution of the practice of IOs to the formation of customary rules qualified. In particular, the ILC study is built upon the unstated premise that the concept of CIL refers to both the process through which customary rules are formed and the outcome of that process. 24 As a result, the scope of the Draft Conclusions covers the requirements for the formation of a customary rule as well as the types of evidence that establish the fulfilment of those requirements.
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In addition, the final text of the Draft Conclusions is largely influenced by the views expressed by the ILC Special Rapporteur, Sir Michael Wood. 26 Without explicitly referring to it, 27 the Special Rapporteur has devised a methodology for identifying CIL firmly rooted on a stream of positivist scholarship which posits that customary rules are the result of a process through which factual elements acquire legal character and that the rule explaining the binding character of CIL is pacta sunt servanda. 28 From this point of view, the customary process turns out to be a voluntary one eventually, and entirely, governed by the will of states. 29 This also entails that states only constitute the primary subjects of international law while IOs are mere agents of states.
It is therefore not surprising that the text of the Draft Conclusions recognizes that a rule of CIL consists of two constituent elements: a general practice and the acceptance of that practice as law. 30 27 Second Report, supra note 1, para. 17. 28 Treves (supra note 24) paras. 4-5. 29 Ibid., para. 8. 30 devote a great deal of attention to the role of state practice in the process of identification of customary rules while reserving a residual role to IOs practice.
The residual role of the practice of international organizations
The main implication stemming from the restrictive conception of general practice endorsed by the ILC is that only verbal and material acts containing an unmediated manifestation of state will can count as evidentiary sources of CIL. 33 Specifically, Draft Conclusion 4 refers to three types of practice that may be relevant to determining the existence of a customary rule:
1. The requirement, as a constituent element of customary international law, of a general practice means that it is primarily the practice of States that contributes to the formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law.
2. In certain cases, the practice of international organizations also contributes to the formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law.
3. Conduct of other actors is not practice that contributes to the formation, or expression, of rules of customary international law, but may be relevant when assessing the practice referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.
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The formulation of Draft Conclusion 4 is problematic in at least two ways. Firstly, it conflates the assessment of instances of relevant practice during the formative process of customary rules and instances of practice as evidentiary sources of an already formed customary rule. 35 It is widely recognized that during the formative stage of custom, manifestations of practice may or may not be based on the belief that they correspond to a legal obligation. 36 Conversely, when determining an applicable rule of CIL, the practice must be seen to conform to the law by the generality of states. 37 As a guide to practitioners, Draft Conclusion 4 should discern between, or warn about, the different weight to be attributed to relevant practice at the constitutive and evidentiary stages. Secondly, the second paragraph states that 'in certain cases' the practice of 54 See the recommendation of the Working Group, supra note 8, para. 1. 55 The Special Rapporteur refers indirectly to this problem in the Second Report; see supra note 1, para. 173. out, reference to IOs is not consistent throughout the Draft Conclusions, since at times they refer to state practice alone 56 and other times to the practice of IOs.
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As it is currently formulated, the text of the Draft Conclusions leads to the awkward conclusion that resolutions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 58 
Resolutions as evidentiary sources of international custom
The lack of coherence in Draft Conclusion 4 is mainly dictated by the strict adherence to the positivist, state-centred understanding of custom set forth in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.
Whether it is arguable that Article 38 ICJ Statute accurately reflects the contemporary role of states as the primary subjects of international law, it does not take into consideration the role IOs play in international relations and how they influence the development of international law, including CIL. b) has led to the crystallization of a rule of customary international law that had started to emerge prior to the conclusion of the treaty; or c) has given rise to a general practice that is accepted as law (opinio juris), thus generating a new rule of customary international law.
2. The fact that a rule is set forth in a number of treaties may, but does not necessarily, indicate that the treaty rule reflects a rule of customary international law. 81 Topical summary of debate in the Sixth Committee, supra note 50, p. 13, para. 50 ("While it was proposed that the Commission examines the role of international organizations in the formation and identification of customary law, the opinion was also expressed that the Commission should not give too much weight to resolutions of international organizations"). 82 Beyond any doubt, by influencing the behaviour of states, resolutions establishing international regimes can variously contribute to the creation and development of CIL. 95 Indeed, the reports of the Special Rapporteur often mention the resolutions of the General
Assembly as the prominent example of acts of IOs capable of contributing to the creation of customary rules. 96 However, based on the unstated assumption that resolutions are nonconclusive acts of the state, 97 the Draft Conclusions do not provide any clear guidance on how they perform that task.
To ask whether resolutions contribute to the creation of CIL amounts to ask how a decision of an IO can affect the behaviour of states. 98 In the ILC study, resolutions are defined as "all decisions and other acts adopted by international organizations or at intergovernmental conferences, whatever their designation and whether or not they are legally binding". 99 Since evidence of this gradual process does not emerge from the text of individual resolutions, it is not possible to find evidence of either state practice or opinio juris by looking at the text of the resolutions alone, as recognized by the Special Rapporteur himself in his third report.
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However, the ILC study simply states that the resolutions drafted in normative language "are those that might be of relevance, and the choice (or avoidance) of particular terms may be significant". 
Overview of the database of General Assembly practice
Quantifying the practice of the UN General Assembly is not an easy task due to the sheer number of resolutions adopted over seven decades. Changes in the General Assembly's working methods also affect the counting of resolutions in two ways. Firstly, groups of closely related resolutions are often assigned the same document number followed by a Latin letter - 110 Among the resolutions adopted with a vote, 360 have been adopted unanimously; however, for 9 resolutions, the voting pattern is unknown. The figures refer to the author's calculation based on the data freely available on the UN website: <www.un.org/en/sections/documents/general-assembly-resolutions/index.html>, 27 April 2017. For the purposes of this article, only the resolutions adopted during regular sessions are considered. In counting the resolutions, consideration has been given the fact that the working methods of the General Assembly have changed over time. In particular, have been adopted by the six main committees rather than in plenary session, subject only to approval in plenary session. 111 The findings also show that the majority of resolutions adopted in plenary session and by the Second, Third, Fifth and Sixth Committees have not been put to vote.
Chart 1: resolutions adopted (1946-2016)* What the empirical reconstruction demonstrates is that the General Assembly in plenary session 
Relationship between groups of resolutions
A closer look at the composition by subject matter of the resolutions adopted within individual committees shows that, with a handful of exceptions, 115 resolutions form groups of re-cited resolutions. Moreover, such groups of re-cited resolutions tend to refer to each other, thus forming broader thematic areas. The table below illustrates a fraction of the pattern of clustering which has developed over time in the practice of the Fourth Committee: The empirical reconstruction of General Assembly's behavioural patterns demonstrates that resolutions have a systemic character -that is to say, they do not exist in isolation from each
other. This in turn suggests that, when it comes to identifying CIL, there is little or no value in trying to establish how a specific resolution has contributed, or is contributing, to the development of a customary rule.
For example, in the field of human rights the UDHR cannot be regarded as evidence of international custom in its own right. On the one hand, the practice of the General Assembly shows that the recognition of both certain rights of women and the freedom of association precedes the adoption of the UDHR. 116 The continuing relevance of both issues has then been reiterated in groups of thematic resolutions up to day. On the other hand, once adopted, the UDHR has appeared as a stand-alone issue only in General Assembly resolutions celebrating the various anniversaries of the Declaration 117 while the individual rights proclaimed in it have been discussed and refined over time as separate thematic issues. 118 Similar considerations apply to the Declaration on Friendly Relations in the field of international peace and security.
Adopted in 1970, the Declaration has been preceded by six resolutions on the same subjectmatter. 119 Individual provisions of the Declaration have then been discussed by the General Assembly under the narrower items of non-use of force in international relations and peaceful settlement of international disputes. The attempt to explain the 'method' for identification of CIL, including the process leading to its formation, is meant to mark the difference between the Draft Conclusions and the 1950 study on evidence of CIL. 125 As it transpires from certain remarks of the Special Rapporteur, his intention was to start a study mirroring the one on interpretation of treaties. 126 However, the work of the ILC ends up providing an ambiguous set of rules describing the process of formation of CIL. 127 The desirability of engaging in this type of study has already been denied in an unofficial survey on items that should not be inscribed on the ILC's agenda. chiefly among them the ICJ, do not rely on any specific methodology or approach to identify the existence of customary rules. 129 The current text of the Draft Conclusions raises a number of questions. One refers to the usefulness of denying the value of clarifying any theoretical approach underpinning the conception of custom adopted by the ILC while at the same time strictly adhering to the letter of Article 38 ICJ Statute and the interpretation given to it by the ICJ. 130 Such an approach has not even been met by the unanimous approval of the ILC members. 131 Another, and more basic, question refers to the appropriateness of assuming that IOs are agents of states. By doing so, the ILC has in essence denied the relevance of the practice of IOs to the process of custom creation while proclaiming the contrary. 132 The lack of clarity about the role of IOs in the process of formation of customary rules also affects the relevance attributed to resolutions as evidentiary sources of custom. The formalistic approach endorsed by the ILC, according to which resolutions adopted by intergovernmental organs reflect the views expressed and the votes cast by states, 133 fails to recognize that the resolutions of IOs in general, and those of the General Assembly in particular, have now acquired a systemic character. 134 Consequently, focussing on individual resolutions as evidence of custom in a decontextualized way does not, and cannot, show the role resolutions play in the process of custom creation. As Franck points out, the General Assembly is the place where politics congeal meaning that states do not adopt resolutions to create or develop international law. 135 Quite the contrary, they pass resolutions to establish international standards of behaviour to be followed on a voluntary basis. Viewed from this angle, the general remark that resolutions framed in normative language have a special evidentiary value for the purposes of identification of CIL is not entirely convincing.
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Another problematic aspect is that Draft Conclusions 4 and 12 are rooted on the assumption that for the purposes of custom creation, resolutions count as acts of states rather than acts of the IOs. A passage from the Special Rapporteur's third report reads:
"if one were not to equate the practice of such international organizations with that of States, this would mean not only that the organization's practice would not be taken into account, but also that its Member States would themselves be deprived of or reduced in their ability to contribute to state practice." 137 From this limited perspective, the ILC Draft Conclusions mirror the position of a much criticized strand of scholarship which, moving from the assumption that the General Assembly is a permanent diplomatic conference, 138 qualify resolutions as acts of states participating in the work of the institution 139 while denying that they constitute formal sources of international law. 140 At the same time, the Draft Conclusions recognize that the practice of IOs as such may contribute to the development of international custom. 141 However, in the plenary debate the Special Rapporteur, faced with criticism by other members of the ILC, 142 clarified that although the adoption of resolutions can be equated to the practice of states, the practice of the IO is a different issue. 143 By making this remark, the Special Rapporteur has ended up endorsing another, and radically opposed, understanding of the nature of General Assembly resolutions as acts of the IO rather than of states. 144 The overall impression one has of Draft Conclusions 4 and 12 is that they do not either reflect a common position of states or provide any authoritative guidance for practitioners. 145 Quite the contrary, they confirm that it is impossible to try to make objective an inherently flexible process such as the one of custom creation. 146 By refusing to engage with the theoretical underpinnings of CIL as a source of international law, the ILC has deliberately left open the option for practitioners to pick and choose the conception of custom as well as the one of resolution that best fits their particular needs. In this respect, the ILC study has failed to achieve its goal of providing authoritative guidance.
Conclusion
The international conferences, since the former are expression of the will of the IO whereas the latter express the collective will of the participating states.
Some of the suggested recommendations imply a radical departure from the method of identification of CIL proposed by the ILC. They may not make the Draft Conclusions particularly original in the light of the 1950 study of the ILC on CIL, but at least they would increase the degree of coherence of the current text making it more compliant with the stated goal of the study.
